We examine the inflation-output variability tradeoffs implied by optimal inflation and price level rules. To be consistent with our earlier work and that of Svensson (1997) , we assume that lagged output enters the aggregate supply function. The introduction of lags is consistent with both the theoretical model of Taylor (1980) who includes both leads and lags of unemployment in the Phillips Curve and the empirical work of Roberts (1995) , who finds serial correlation in the error terms of his estimated Phillips Curves. Our intuition is that price level targeting should be preferable in a sticky-price world where prices are costly to adjust. If prices were perfectly flexible, alternative monetary policy rules would have almost no effect on real output. But in world where it is costly to adjust prices, a policy that reduces price fluctuations would seem to be appropriate. Indeed, we find that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve provides even stronger support for price level targeting than did the model with the neoclassical Phillips Curve.
In previous work with the Neoclassical Phillips Curve, we found that the choice between inflation targeting and price level targeting depended on the amount of persistence in the output gap. That is, if the output gap was not too persistent, or if lagged output did not enter the aggregate supply function, then inflation targets were preferred to price level targets. However, empirical evidence showed a very high level of persistence in the output gap, suggesting that price level targets offer the policymaker a better menu of tradeoffs between output and inflation variability.
To preview the results in this article, we show that when we start with a New Keynesian Phillips Curve, the amount of persistence in the output gap still affects the relative placement of the inflation-output variability tradeoff. But, contrary to the Neoclassical case, even where the persistence of the output gap in the aggregate supply function is small or nonexistent, the price level targeting regime still results in a more favorable tradeoff between output and inflation variability than does an inflationtargeting regime.
In the first section we briefly describe the New Keynesian model and compare it to the Neoclassical specification. In the second section, we construct the inflation-output variability curves implied by alternative parameterizations of the model. In conclusion, we discuss the assumptions that are apparently needed to find that price level targeting would destabilize output. Roberts (1995) shows that the sticky price models of Taylor (1980 ), Rotemberg (1982 , and Calvo (1983) all imply the same Phillips Curve structure which has been called New Keynesian. We begin with the same infinite-horizon, quadratic loss function used in our earlier work. The central bank with an inflation target minimizes The Neoclassical Phillips Curve used in our earlier paper is given by 
A NEW KEYNESIAN PHILLIPS CURVE
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Since the bank is trying to optimize by influencing expectations, the first order condition taken with respect to t+1 takes the form, which is different from that for t . If the bank were to re-optimize at time t+1, it will rederive a first order condition for t+1 that mirrors the one derived for t at time t, yet is distinct from that derived for t+1 at time t. Since the first order conditions derived at any time characterize the bank's optimal policy, the bank's chosen policy at time t will be found sub-optimal at time t+1, hence the time inconsistency. As is well understood, without some mechanism to commit at time t, the bank will be tempted to re-optimize, renege on any decisions made at time t, and derive a new policy at time t+1.
Curve. King and Watson (1994) show that this distinction can be important when estimating the parameters from historical data, but it does not matter in our analytical work.
Intuitively, the problem of time inconsistency here results from the ability of a bank facing a New Keynesian Phillips Curve to derive rewards today by creating expectations for tomorrow. When a new period arrives, the temptation is to confound expectations with new policy since the gains from the previously announced policy have already been taken.
In equilibrium, the central bank cannot benefit from reneging on announced policies. If the bank re-optimizes each period, or even only occasionally, then private agents will learn that the bank's announced future policy will not necessarily be implemented. When this occurs, the bank's ability to control expectations will be lost. To avoid this time inconsistency problem, we assume that the central bank takes private sector expectations as given. Under this assumption, the bank, recognizing that it may be unable to commit to policy announcements, forgoes any attempt to manipulate private expectations.
When the bank regards expectations as given, the bank's optimization problem becomes a standard one, with a quadratic objective and linear constraints. Furthermore, first order conditions take a standard form for all time periods, assuring policy rules are time consistent. Linear decision rules can be conjectured for the bank's optimal policy.
Upon substituting the conjectured linear rules into the first order conditions for the bank's optimization problem, we equate coefficients on the variables in the decision rules and derive the bank's policy function. We assume that the bank, in taking expectations as given, bases its time t decisions on current states, y t-1 and t , in both regimes and p t-1 in the case of a price-level-targeting regime. Expectations are then assumed to be formed as a rational consequence of the bank's policy rule.
It is much simpler to derive policy rules under an inflation targeting regime. The derivation of these rules closely follows the derivation in the appendix of Dittmar et al. (1999 
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Here the central bank wants to smooth inflation deviations from target with an adjustment for the current output gap. If there is no persistence in the output gap, then the desired inflation deviations today depend only on the output gap.
We now seek a linear decision rule for inflation of the form:
Expectations of the private sector are assumed to be rational, so at time t we have: The parameterizations used here are the same as the ones used by Dittmar et al. (1999a) : a = 0.5, b = 0.99, and r = 0.9. These assumptions imply a Phillips Curve slope of 0.2 when the Phillips Curve is written in terms of the inflation rate. Using this form, Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) estimate the slope to be 0.14, and Orphanides (1998) estimates the slope to be .18 with a standard error of 0.07. We assume that the interest rate is 4 percent at an annual rate, so the quarterly discount factor is approximately 0.99.
As the Figure 1 shows, the tradeoff is similar across the two model specifications except for extreme cases where the central bank puts little weight on the deviation of inflation from target. In the Neoclassical case, the variance of inflation rises monotonically with l, the relative weight the central bank puts on the output gap in its loss function. In the New Keynesian case, with this parameterization, the curve bends back; that is, inflation variability begins to decline after l goes above 3. We have found the simplest way to eliminate multipliers from the bank's first order conditions is to regard both sequences above as linear systems in the unknown multipliers.
The sequence of first order conditions derived as a result of differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to the sequence of y t 's can be written as the linear system 
Thus, we can conclude from the first set of first order conditions that expressed as algebraic functions of the unknown decision rule parameters A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , and B 2 . With this representation we can substitute into the first order condition, explicitly sum the resulting geometric series on the supposition that both 1 and 2 are less than 1 in absolute value, and finally equate coefficients on state variables. We have found the resulting equations for the coefficients in the decision rules to be too algebraically complex to admit a closed form solution. However, we have solved them numerically for a range of parameters. We found that both roots, 1 and 2 , were real and inside the unit circle. We then calculated the inflation-output tradeoff implied by varying l, the bank's relative preference for output stability, between zero and infinity. believe is a realistic amount of persistence, r = 0.9 (see Figure 3) . The price level target results in a better inflation-output variability tradeoff than does an inflation target. Figure   4 shows that price level targeting still dominates inflation targeting when r = 0.5. In the Neoclassical case, the tradeoffs were identical in this case. As r falls below 0.5, the inflation target dominated the price level target in our earlier analysis. In contrast, Figure   5 shows that, under the New Keynesian specification, inflation targeting results in a worse tradeoff between inflation and output variability even when r = 0.
In summary, Dittmar et al. (1999) , assuming a Neoclassical Phillips Curve, found that price level targeting dominated inflation targeting for cases where the output gap was relatively persistent; that is, when r > 0.5. In this article, we find that when we use a New Keynesian Phillips Curve, price level targeting always dominates inflation targeting, even if we omit the lagged output gap from the aggregate supply function.
IT'S NOT THE PHILLIPS CURVE, IT'S EXPECTATIONS FORMATION
This raises an important issue. Simulations of econometric models typically find that targeting the price level is a bad idea. Economists have attributed this result to the presence of nominal rigidities such as wage contracts or price adjustment costs. Yet in these econometric experiments, it is also true that inflation expectations are almost always considered to be formed adaptively. For example, Haldane and Salmon (1995) use a small econometric model with adaptive inflation expectations to examine whether monetary policy targets for price stability should be expressed in levels or rates of change. They find that price level targeting results in higher short-run variability for both inflation and output growth. These results are typical of econometric model simulations with backward-looking expectations (See Haldane and Salmon for references).
There are at least two examples where central bank economists conducted experiments with price level targets using econometric models modified to include some forward-looking behavior. Black, Macklem, and Rose (1997) We focus on an extreme comparison in our analysis, inflation targeting versus price level targeting. Our results suggest that targeting the price level in the short run may work better than previously thought. But these results should be put into perspective. We do not have enough confidence in the short-run dynamics of economy to recommend that any central bank adopt a policy rule that would represent a sharp break with current practice. Rather, the role of the price level target is to provide a long-term anchor for the monetary system. Dittmar et al. (1999b) showed that a central bank can dramatically reduce the uncertainty about inflation inherent in an inflation-targeting regime by 1) adopting a long-term price level objective, and 2) using it in an errorcorrection framework to modify the short-run inflation targets. That analysis was based on an aggregate model including the Neoclassical Phillips Curve. But as we have shown here, the results would not be substantially different if we had started with a New Keynesian specification. 
